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Daniel J. Rozell†
In early May of 1992, Paul Feyerabend delivered a series of four public
lectures at the University of Trent, Italy. Feyerabend edited the recorded
transcripts the following year and the work was published posthumously in
Italian in 1996. It wasn’t until 2011 that the lectures were published in English
as The Tyranny of Science, largely due to the efforts of the editor Eric Oberheim.
In the introduction, Oberheim explains that Feyerabend starts with an
apology to the audience because the lecture series is a condensed version of
a semester-long course he developed over thirty years while at University of
California, Berkeley. The theme of the lectures is a discussion of how modern
scientific rationalism arose in Western society and why we should question
its claims of epistemological superiority. In accordance with his skepticism
of systematization and our ability to know the “truth,” Feyerabend prefers
to present his lectures as “fairytales woven around events that are vaguely
historical” (p. 13).
At a midpoint in the lectures, Feyerabend summarizes his main ideas in
four propositions: (1) pluralism is necessary for science despite the objections
of many scientists; (2) world views may take a long time to yield useful results;
(3) the importance of any particular theory varies by community; and, (4)
history shows that it is perfectly rational to propose theories that contradict the
currently accepted world view (p. 43). Throughout the lectures, Feyerabend cites
ancient Greece as the starting point for various prevalent ideas in contemporary
science. For example, scientists are compared to the ancient Gnostics (pp. 10-11)
for their shared beliefs in an eternal and stable objective reality and that our
everyday lives are illusory. This idea is tracked through history starting with
Thales’s theory of water as the first principle, Xenophanes’s theory of a single
divine being, and Parmenides’ theory of Being. Feyerabend’s description of the
Parmenides connection to modern theoretical physics is particularly compelling
(pp. 38-39). Because Parmenides separates all of reality into Being and not-Being,
it logically follows that reality is unchanging because Being never becomes
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not-Being and vice versa.While this argument sounds vaguely foolish tomodern
ears, Feyerabend points out that today’s scientists generally believe that basic
scientific laws should not contain space-time parameters and are, thus, built on
the very same assumption of unchanging reality. Einstein is given as an example
when he wrote in a leer to the sister of his departed friend Michele Besso:
“For us who are convinced physicists the distinction between past, present, and
future has no other meaning than that of an illusion, though a tenacious one”
(pp. 39, and 140). Of course, within the physics community, there is a wide range
of philosophical positions on the nature of time. While J.M.E. McTaggart and,
more recently, Julian Barbour, are true eternalists in the tradition of Parmenides,
the majority of physicists (of those that bother to consider the issue at all)
primarily focus on the inconsistency between the human experience (i.e., the
forward flow of time) and the fact that themajor theories of physics—Newtonian
mechanics, electrodynamics, relativity, statistical mechanics, even quantum
mechanics—are all time-direction invariant (e.g. Albert 2000).
While examining the claims that science embodies objective knowledge and
should be respected because of its accomplishments, Feyerabend argues that
scientific materialism is only one of many world views and that it is idealistically
portrayed. He points out that, despite a long-held belief that empiricism, in
the tradition of Aristotle, is the foundation of science, the heliocentrist trio
of Copernicus, Kepler, and Galileo were able to achieve considerable success
by abandoning the very rational, natural and experiential assumption that the
earth was stationary (pp. 49-54). A nice example of the tenuous assertion of
rationality in science is described in a debate between Newton and Leibniz
regarding discrepancies in Newton’s law of gravitation to explain the orbits
of Jupiter and Saturn (p. 41). Newton invoked the hand of God to keep the
planets in their proper place, while Leibniz argued that God, being perfect, would
never design a system that needed his constant aention. Given the supposed
rationality of the scientific world view, it is indeed surprising to see two revered
scientists arguing purely theological positions.
The practical implications of Feyerabend’s skepticism are a main theme of
the third lecture, titled “The Abundance of Nature.” Because scientists require
considerable funding for research that they suggest will lead to solutions to
societal problems, it is important for the taxpayer to understand what can be
realistically expected. Feyerabend contends that experience and traditional skills
in fields such as engineering and medicine have been pushed aside by theory
to the detriment of society. Decomposing problems and then recomposing
solutions has some success in simple situations, but in complex problems (e.g.,
ecological systems), the method is likely to fall short. Instead, the hard-won
practical knowledge of history and local experience should be consulted with
as much deference as current scientific theory.
It can be difficult to criticize Feyerabend’s methods. He, more than
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anyone, realizes the limitations of any method and liberally spreads caveats
and warnings throughout his discussions. Nonetheless, some have criticized
Feyerabend’s ideas based on his interpretation or selection of historical events
or his seeming very lack of method. However, assuming a traditional Popperian
world view of science and rationalism, falsification of a theory is possible, but
proof is not. Since Feyerabend is trying to show that history disproves an
objective, successful and standard scientific method, his falsification case is the
easier case to make than those trying to prove that science is epistemologically
superior.
For those familiar with Feyerabend’s previous works, one potential criticism
of The Tyranny of Science is that it does not propose any substantially new ideas,
retractions, or conversions. Of course, that was not the intent of the lecture series
on which the book was based. Another objection can be lodged regarding the
rather disorganized format of the book. Topics are revisited aer long tangential
discussions and ideas are reiterated in subsequent lectures. Again, this is an
artifact of the book as a representative transcript of a public lecture. Conversely,
for others, this style will be seen as an asset. The many ruminations, minor
points, and asides contain original thoughts in various stages of development
that make the book well worth reading. In particular, each lecture ends with
a question and answer session. While the topics oen diverge from the main
theme of the lectures, they are no less enlightening than the lectures themselves
and show Feyerabend to be an extemporaneous storyteller of the highest caliber.
And, of course, throughout the book there is plenty of classic Feyerabend
warmth and wit for both Feyerabend enthusiasts and newcomers to his work
to enjoy.
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